In this paper 
Introduction
The question of how it is possible for a group of independent individuals achieve both their own goals and a common goal has been addressed in many fields. By a common goal we mean a goal achievable by a group to require cooperation. The key element that distinguishes a common goal from an individual goal is that it requires collective action. Collective action, however, poses difficult problems, and it requires cooperation to overcome them. Coordination is different concept from cooperation, which does not assume the existence of the common goal shared by members. Coordination is necessary to achieve individuals' independent goals efficiently. The design of efficient collective action from bottom up becomes to a crucial issue in many disciplines [1] [2] . It also an interesting problem is under what circumstances will a collection of interacting agents could realize efficient coordination from bottom up [11] [12] .
There are strong interests in many disciplines to answer the following questions: how do agents with heterogeneous micro-motives generate self-organized global macroscopic orders or regularities. However, there has been no natural methodology for systematically studying the dynamics of highly interacting heterogeneous agents. Some models treat adaptive processes with the assumption of the homogeneous payoff. Interdependent situations, in which an agent's decision depends on the decisions of other agents, are the ones that usually don't permit any simple summation or extrapolation to the aggregate. To make that connection we usually have to look at the system of collective interaction among individuals, which is also treated as the relation between individuals and the collectivity.
Collective means any pair of a complex system of autonomous components, together with a performance criterion by which we rank the behavior of the overall system. Wolpert and Tumer propose that the fundamental issue is to focus on improving our formal understanding of two closely related issues concerning collective [25] [26] : (1) The forward problem of how the fine-grained structure of the system underlying a collective determines its complex emergent behavior and therefore its performance. ( 2) The inverse problem of how to design the structure of the system underlying a collective to induce optimal performance.
In examining collective, we shall draw heavily on the individual decisions. Indeed, an organization or society does not make decisions, individual do. It might be argued that understanding how individual make decisions is sufficient to understand and improve collective action. Much literature on collective has reacted against the older notion that irrationality is the key to explanation. They agree that collective often result from rational and calculated action. In this paper, we take a different view. Although individual decision is nested within important to understand, it is not sufficient to describe how a collection of agents arrives at specific decisions. These situations, in which an agent decision depends on the decisions of the others, are the ones that usually do not permit any simple summation or extrapolation to the aggregates. To make that connection we usually have to look at the system of interactions between agents and the collectivity. Sometimes the analysis of the collective is difficult, and it is inconclusive [2] [17] [18] [24] . But even an inconclusive analysis warned against jumping to conclusions about the behavior of aggregates from what one knows or can guess about agent interests or motivations, or jumping to conclusions about agent intentions from the observations of aggregates.
We are also interested in how the society gropes for its way towards equilibrium in an imperfect world of locally interacting agents. There is no presumption that the self-interested behavior of agents should usually lead to collectively satisfactory results [9] [14] [20] [21] . How well each agent does for it in adapting to its social environment is not the same thing as how satisfactory a social environment they collectively create for themselves. While all agents understand the outcome is inefficient, acting independently is powerless to manage this collective about what to do and also how to decide. The question of whether interacting heterogeneous agents self-organize efficient macroscopic orders from bottom up depends on how they interact each other. We attempt to probe deeper understanding this issue by specifying how they adapt each other. We consider two types of interaction, symmetric and asymmetric interaction. With symmetric interaction an agent receives a payoff if he chooses the same action as the majority does. With asymmetric interaction an agent receives a payoff if he chooses the same action as the minority does. Agents myopically adapt their behavior based on their idiosyncratic rule to others' behaviors. We analyze adaptive dynamics that relate the collective with the underlying individual adaptive behaviors. There are many parameters to be considered, among them, we examine the heterogeneity of utility and the configuration of locating agents. We evaluate emergent collective from the criteria of efficiency and equity. We show that interacting agents outperform when they adapt to local information rather than to global information. 
Agent

Examples of collective with interacting agents
We address specific problems of collective with interacting agents. Social interactions pose many coordination problems to individuals. There are many situations where interacting agents can benefit from coordinating their action. Agents face problems of sharing and distributing limited resources in an efficient way. in which each agent faces the binary decision problem. Agents periodically have to make decision to add the network or sever from it. Agents try to establish links in order to achieve higher payoffs. If the more agents join the network, the higher the payoff they receive, and this property is referred to as network externality [5] [6] . Perhaps an essential point to put forward is that networks induce a special interdependency and a specific heterogeneity, which can affect network structure and aggregate phenomena in ways that are out of reach without them. To capture the intuition of this, it is enough to accept an agent's rational decision, depends on the agents it is directly linked with. This interdependence with heterogeneity in decision may in turn influence the evolution of the networks. Here, each agent A i ∈G has the following two strategies:
Joins to the network, S 2 : Does not join the network (2.1)
The number of agents to choose S 1 (trade) is denoted by n (0 ≤ n ≤ N ). Agent A i acquires a benefit of a i (n / N ), a fixed value a i multiplied by the proportion of agents who join the network. If agent A i adds to the network, a cost c i is incurred. An agent can get a benefit as a spillover effect by b i (n / N ) (a i ≥ b i ), even if she does not add to the networks. The payoff of agent A i when she chooses S 1 or S 2 is given as follows:
The utility of agent A i to choose S 1 or S 2 is illustrated as the function of (n/N) in Fig.2 . The utility of each agent is an increasing function of the population of agents in the network n/N. 
(2) Route selection by heterogeneous agents
There is another type of interaction in which we have to utilize different methodology. We consider a competitive routing problem of networks, in which the paths from sources to destination have to be established by independent agents. For example, in the context of traffic networks, agents have to determine their route independently. In telecommunication networks, they have to decide on what fraction of their traffic to send on each link of the network. Consider two parallel routes A and B, and each agent has to choose independently one of the two routes. As shown in Fig.3 , each agent has the following two strategies:
Chooses the route A, S 2 : Chooses the route B (2.
3)
The utility of each agent is determined what the majority does, and each agent gains utility only if she chooses the opposite route of the majority does. The utility function of agent A i if she chooses S 1 or S 2 is given as follows:
The payoff of agent A i if he chooses S 1 is a linearly decreasing function of the proportion of the same decision. On the other hand, the payoff if he chooses S 2 is a linearly increasing function of the proportion of agents with the opposite decision. The utility of agent A i when she chooses S 1 or S 2 is illustrated s as the function of (n/N) in Fig.4 . Large-scale interactions with N-persons can be decomposed into the problem of the interaction between an individual and the aggregate. In the network formation problem in the previous section, we define the payoff matrix of each agent as given in Table 1 . 
The expected payoff of agent A i if she chooses S 1 or S 2 is given as follows:
Therefore, we have the same utility function with (2.2). Since matrix of the two-person game is invariant for the affine transformation [27] , the payoff matrix of Table 1 can be equivalently transformed into the matrix of Table 2 , where
Similarly the payoff matrix of agent A i in the route selection problem can be given as in Table 3 . The matrix of Table 3 can be also equivalently transformed into the matrix of Table 4 , where
) . Table 3 The payoff matrix of agent A i Table 4 The payoff matrix of agent
Choice of other Agents Choice of agent A i
They have to coordinate their decisions with others in order to improve their utility. We distinguish the two types of the above interaction as symmetric and asymmetric interaction [18] [19] . Interaction usually implies that increased effort by some agents leads the remaining agents to follow suit, which gives multiplier effects [16] . We call this type of interaction as symmetric interaction. On the other hand, in the route selection problem, agents receive payoff if they select the opposite strategy as the majority does. This type of interaction is distinguished as asymmetric interaction. This type interaction is also referred as minority games in which agents receive payoff if he selects the same strategy as the minority does [1] [19] [23] . For realizing efficient and equitable distributions of limited resources, agents normally react to aggregate of others' decisions. The resulting volatile collective decision is often far from being efficient. The overall performance depends crucially on the type of interaction as well as the heterogeneity of agent preferences.
Global Adaptation vs. Local Adaptation
In examining collective decisions, we shall draw heavily on the individual adaptive decisions. Within the scope of our model, we treat models in which agents make deliberate decisions by applying rational procedures, which also guide their reasoning. In order to describe the adaptation process at the individual level, we may have two fundamental models, global adaptation and local adaptation. It is important to consider with whom an agent interacts and how each agent decides his action depending on others' actions. Agents may adapt based on the aggregate information representing the current status of the whole system (global adaptation) as shown in Fig.5 (a) . In this case, each agent chooses an optimal decision based on aggregate information about how all other agents behaved in the past. An agent calculates her reward and plays her best response strategy. An important assumption of global adaptation is that they receive knowledge of the aggregate.
In many situations, agents are not assumed to be knowledgeable as to correctly guess or anticipate other agents' actions, or they are less sophisticated and that they do not know how to calculate best replies [11] . With local adaptation each agent is modeled to adapt to her neighbors [10] [14] . The hypothesis of local adaptation also reflects limited ability of agents' parts to receive, decide, and act based upon information they receive in the course of interaction. As a specific model, we consider the lattice structure as shown in Fig.5 (b) , in which each agent interacts with his neighbors. The main point is that an agent's decision depends on what it knows about others. At each period of time, each agent decides whether to add or sever the network given the knowledge. An agent thinks strategically, knowing that everyone else is also making a rational decision given global or local information. 
Aggregate Information
Agent A i (a) Global adaptation (b) Local adaptation
[Global adaptation and symmetric interaction]
We obtain the adaptive rule of each agent as her best response. Let's denote the proportion of agents having chosen S 1 at time t in a population by p t ( ) . Agent A i of the payoff parameter θ i in Table 2 calculates her expected utilities as follows:
By comparing the expected utilities under S 1 and S 2 , the optimal adaptive rule of agent A i is obtained as the function of the aggregate information on collective p t ( ) and her idiosyncratic payoff θ i (defined as threshold) as follows:
[Local adaptation and symmetric interaction]
The local adaptive rule is obtained as follows. Let's denote the proportion of the neighbors of agent A i having chosen S 1 at time t by p t i ( ) . The optimal adaptive rule with local adaptation is obtained as follows:
[Global adaptation and asymmetric interaction]
We obtain the adaptive rules of agents with asymmetric interaction. Let's denote the proportion of agents having chosen S 1 at time t in a population by p t ( ) . Agent A i of the payoff parameter θ i in Table 3 calculates her expected utilities as follows: 
Heterogeneity in Preferences and Representation of Diversity
The crucial concept for describing heterogeneity of agents is their preference characterized by their threshold θ i . Threshold models choose the elements of collective which game theory handles only with difficulty and makes them central: substantial heterogeneity of preferences and inter dependence of decisions over time. This is possible because that the payoff matrix is replaced by a one-dimensional vector of threshold one for each agent, which allows enormous simplification in the ensuring analysis.
In this section, we consider several collections of heterogeneous agents. We also characterize the diversity of heterogeneous agents from both threshold distribution and the configuration of their location. Each agent has an idiosyncratic threshold θ i , and the diversity of heterogeneous agents is represented by the distribution of θ . We classify heterogeneous agents into the following two types:
( We assume the proportions of agents of Type 1 and Type 2 in a collection of agents
are the same. We denote the number of agents with the same threshold θ in G by n( ) θ . We define the density of θ by f ( ) θ , which is obtained by divided n( ) θ by the total number of agent N ,
We also assume that the threshold distribution f ( ) θ is symmetric with the property
As specific examples, we consider the distribution functions as shown in Fig.6 . In these cases, the average of the threshold is 0.5, i.e., 
Evaluation of the Systems of Collective
In this section, we evaluate collective of interacting heterogeneous agents with three criteria, stability, efficiency and equity. The stability of collective is from the point of the path-dependency of collective. We obtain and evaluate the proportion of agents who choose each strategy staring from any initial condition. Efficiency is evaluated by obtaining the average utility, which also stands for the measure of the desirability at the macro level. Equity is evaluated by obtaining the utility distribution, which stand for the measure of the desirability at the micro level.
(1) Collective under symmetric interaction < Efficiency > We characterize collective at equilibrium by p * , which represents the proportion of agents to choose S 1 at equilibrium. The efficiency of global adaptation is evaluated as follows: The adaptive rule of each agent at equilibrium is given by (3.2) . Agents with the threshold θ is less than or equal to p * receive the utility at the level of
Agents whose threshold θ are greater than p * choose S 2 , and then they receive their utility at the level of:
Therefore, the average utility U is obtained as: < Equity > The proportion of agents who gain the utility u by choosing S 1 is given as f ( ) 1 − θ . Therefore, we have the utility distribution as follows:
The proportion of agents who gain the utility u by choosing S 2 is given by f ( ) θ . Therefore, we have the utility distribution.
Therefore, the overall utility distribution is obtained as:
The utility distribution g u ( ) of collective equilibrium p * is obtained as:
The Gini ratio ϕ ( ) 0 1 ≤ ≤ ϕ is often used to measure the extent to which the utility distribution of a society. The Gini ratio can be obtained from a Lorenz curve. The Gini ratio is obtained by measuring the area surrounded by the Lorenz curve L x ( ) in Fig.8 . The x -axis represents the cumulative proportion of agents and y -axis represents the cumulative proportion of the total utility L x ( ) , which is cumulated to the proportion at the level x starting with the poorest agents. The Gini ratio ϕ is then defined as
The measure of equity E which global adaptation is then obtained as follows:
Using the proportion of agents g u ( ) who obtain the utility level u , the Lorenz curve L x ( ) is given as follows:
Where w is defined as the parameter satisfying
Fig.8: The Lorenz curve and the Gini ratio (2) Collective under asymmetric interaction
The adaptive rule of an agent who faces asymmetric interaction is given by (3.5). Agents whose threshold θ is less than equal p * at equilibrium receive the utility at the level of
Agents whose threshold θ is greater than p * choose S 2 , and they receives utility
The average utility U (efficiency) is obtained as the same as given in (5.3), and the efficiency and equity are the same as the case of symmetric interaction.
Simulation Results
We arrange a collection of heterogeneous agents in the area of 50 50 × (2500 agents in total) with no gap, and four corners and an edge of an area connect it with an opposite side. The consequence of their actions also gives an effect on agents with whom not directly linked. We are interested in the long-run behavior of collective when heterogeneous interacting agents adapt their decisions over time. We especially investigate how agents' decisions combine with the decisions of the others produces the macro behavior. We impose only a weak monotonic condition reflecting the inertia and myopia hypotheses on the dynamics, which describe the changes in the number of agents playing each strategy.
Collective of Symmetric Interaction (1) Global adaptation
The simulation results of global adaptation are shown in Fig.9 . In Fig.9 (a) , the x -axis represents the proportion of agents having chosen S 1 initially and the y -axis represents collective p * at equilibrium. Collective decision p * at equilibrium depends on both the population structure and the initial value. In Fig.9 (b) , and the y -axis represents the average utility U at equilibrium. In all cases, efficiencies U are less than 0.5. In Fig.9 (c) , the y -axis represents the equity E at equilibrium. Collective behavior is similar to the global adaptation model in Fig.9 (a) , although the turning point is dull in all cases as shown in Fig.10 (a) . The average utilities U of all cases are almost 0.5 ( Fig.10 (b) ). Efficiency is also close to the case of the global adaptation ( Fig.9 (b) ). Fig.11 (a) ). Simulation result of Case 1 is the same as the adaptation to random neighbors. The average utilities U of all cases become to be more than 0.5 ( Fig.11 (b) ) and equity E are also high (Fig.11 (c) ). From these results, local adaptation to homogeneous neighbors result in desirable behavior. For a population of identical agents (Case 1), all agents have the same payoff and equity is the highest, however, the efficiency is moderate. In global adaptation with divers population, efficiency is moderate and equity is also high. In local adaptation with random neighbors, both efficiency and equity are low, and diversity tightens gap in efficiency and equity. with the homogeneous neighbors, both efficiency and equity become high.
